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A BLUE PRINT FOR THE CERTIFIED CHECK*
RoscoE T.

STEFFEN** AND WILLIAm

F.

STARR***

In the growth of an institution' there are often many stages, before it repches old age and is cast aside, if that time ever comes. It is
the resultant of a variety of forces, some enlightened, some blind. It
is shaped this way and that to answer varying demands of business, of
politics, of law, of ethics. It may be constricted for a time, or even lose
its identity entirely, by being forced into some category with other
things-a consequence of too limited imagination, or the urge to
standardize. At all events the certified check has been no exception.
Like other legal-economic institutions it has been builded piecemeal,
with many builders and few architects, much tearing down and rebuilding, and, of course, much argument throughout. But, though it has
survived and at times flourished for at least a century as a distinctive
American institution, 2 things have now come to a point where some
careful planning 3 is needed to safeguard its immediate future.
THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES

The first cause of present concern grows out of a relatively small
matter. It appears that in 1915 a draft for $629.80 drawn by a St.
Louis bank upon the National City Bank of Chicago was stolen from the
mail while in transit to the payee. The thief, a person named Manning,
erased the payee's name, inserting his own in its stead, and presented
the draft to Barnett Bros., Chicago, in purchase of diamonds to the fair
value of $600. For reasons that do not appear-but may be surmisedBarnett asked to be permitted to have the check certified, apparently before releasing the diamonds. In any case the item indorsed by Manning
was regularly certified by the National City Bank, the amount being
charged to the drawer's account, and was later paid through the clear* The writers are very much indebted to Friedrich Kessler, Privatdozent at the
Handelshochschule, Berlin, Rockefeller Fellow at the Yale Law School, for
preparation of the notes on points of comparative law.

** Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
*** S. J. D. 1935 Yale, member of the Bar of the State of Washington.

'The discourse by Hamilton on the Institution in 7 ENcYa. OF Soc. SCIENCES
84-89 (1932) is good reading.
'The earliest American case found treating of the practice is that of Phoenix
Bank v. Bank of America (1842) 1 N. Y. LEG. Ons. 26. See 'tfra note 69 et. scq.
' The present study proceeds upon the assumption that, although many things
apparently just happen, it is quite possible in a world of choice to shape affairs,
within certain limits, to accomplish desired purposes. See BEARD, TnE OPEN DOOR
AT HOmE (1934) pp. 33-34. Of course, whether use of the certified check should be
encouraged or discouraged, is recognized as a problem of values at the bottom of
the whole inquiry.

A BLUE PRINT FOR THE CERTIFIED CHECK

451

ing house to the Bank of the Republic with which it had been deposited
by Barnett. Upon the fraud being discovered, shortly after, the National
City Bank recredited the drawer's account, as obviously it had to, and
the question then was: Who should take the loss?
There were two almost equally arguable technical positions, neither
paying much attention to the welfare of the certified check. It was
contended 'by the drawee that upon all the decisions, both in this country4 and in England, 5 the amount of the check could be recovered from
the Bank of the Republic as money paid under mistake of fact. And of
course the point cannot be gainsaid; the Price v. Neal doctrine 6 went
no further than to charge the drawee with knowledge of the drawer's
signature and the state of his account, matters peculiarly within the
drawee's knowledge. For the holders it was contended, however, that
under the N. I. L., section 62, the drawee by certifying admitted the existence of the payee and agreed to pay according to the tenor of its
certification. And to the suggestion that this meant the original and
not the altered tenor it was pointed out that the drawee could not well
admit the existence of a payee of whom it had never heard, 7 and that
the most reasonable interpretation of its promise to pay was that it
undertook according to the tenor of the paper as it appeared when certified.
The matter had finally to be taken up for a decision upon the "law."
It was ruled by the Illinois court 8 in 1921 that the holder had the right
of the matter and the drawee was denied recovery; the statute had
changed the common law, or at least it was so held.9 And, although
the case had come up on a narrow set of facts, for it is not often that
'First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 152 Ill. 296, 38 N. E. 739 (1894) ;
Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 182 Ill. 367, 55 N. E. 360 (1899) ;
Parke v. Roser, 67 Ind. 500 (1879) ; Marine Nat. Bank v. National City Bank, 59
N. Y. 67 (1874) ; Security Bank v. Nat. Bank of Republic, 67 N. Y. 458 (1876).
And see Continental Nat. Bank v. Tradesman's Nat. Bank, 173 N. Y. 272, 65
N. E. 1108 (1903) (where the drawee had disregarded an advice of drawing).
In Continental Nat. Bank v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank of Chicago, 107 Ill. App.
455 (1903) recovery was denied due to delay of five years in making demand.
Apparently the only common law case squarely contra is Louisiana Nat. Bank v.
Citizen's Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189, 26 Am. Rep. 92 (1876).
0 See Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank of Hamilton (1903)
A. C. 49.
03 Burr.
1354 (K. B. 1762). And see Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal
(1926) 24 MIcH. L. REV. 809.
7 Of course the drawee almost never knows or cares who the payee is as a
matter of actual practice; it therefore may be said ordinarily to admit the existence
of a payee of whom it knows nothing.
8 National City Bank of Chicago v. National Bank of the Republic, 300 Ill. 103,
132 N. E. 832 (1921).
'Had the payee's indorsement simply been forged there is no doubt upon the
decisions that the bank's certification would be unenforceable as regards any person holding through the forged indorsement. The court did not purport to overrule its prior decisions to that effect. First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank,
'152 II1. 296, 38 N. E. 739 (1894) ; State Bank v. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank,
295 Ill. 599, 129 N. E. 489 (1920).
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the payee's name is erased and that of the forger substituted, it followed
from the holding that the many cases involving raised paper would be
ruled in the same way. 10 Clearly, if certification is an undertaking
speaking as of the time of the certification, the undertaking in the
case of raised paper is to pay the raised amount. The vista thus opened
to certifying banks indicating large losses in future was by no means
reassuring."
The outlook, moreover, was particularly discouraging,
since there was no suggestion of any recourse over, except of course
that against the forger, if he could be found.
The commentators upon the question, as is their wont, contented
themselves for the most part with demonstrating that the case was
wrongly decided. 12 And probably it was; as a technical matter.13
The argument that Section 132, which provides that by acceptance "the
acceptor signifies his assent to the orderof the drawer," and so not to that
of the forger, 14 should have been considered in construing Section 62,
o The case of Central Nat. Bank v. F. W. Drosten Jewelry Co., 203 Mo. App.
646, 220 S. W. 511 (1920) involved exactly these facts, except that the jeweler,
substituted payee, asked for the drawee bank's cashier's check instead of its certification. It was held that, in effect, this was merely a payment of the check
and according to rules established for many generations the raised amount could
be recovered back as money paid under mistake of fact. It was immaterial that
the jeweler had first been told orally by the bank that the check was good and
that he had not delivered over the jewelry to the forger until after receiving the
cashier's check.
U Probably no rule is better established than that the holder takes the risk that
his paper may have been raised-that is, when he receives payment alone rather
than certification followed by payment. White v. Continental Nat. Bank, 64
N. Y. 316, 21 Am. Rep. 612 (1876). Of course the drawee may nonetheless, in a
'proper case, be estopped by its conduct from recovering. United States v.
National Exchange Bank, 270 U. S. 527, 46 Sup. Ct. 388 70 L. ed. 717 (1925) ;
'Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919).
But if holders were to be able, by adopting the simple device of procuring certifica,tion ahead of payment, to throw all losses of this character on the paying banker,
a very great aggregate loss would be shifted. Whether the banker should bear
this loss, nonetheless, is a question to be considered.
' See the following notes adversely criticizing the decision: (1922) 6 MINN. L.
'Rxv. 405; (1922) 16 ILL. L. REv. 615; (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 260 and (1922) 31
YALE L. J. 548. Approving the decision, principally as a matter of policy: (1922)
35 HA.v. L. REv. 749; (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 522 and (1923) 4 ILL. L. Q. 202.
'
The one decision holding the same way prior to the N. I. L. appears to have

grown out of a misunderstanding of the scope of the Price v. Neal doctrine.

Louisiana National Bank v. Citizens Bank of Louisiana, 28 La. Ann. 189, 26 Am.
'Rep. 92 (1876). Likewise the decisions regarding accepted bills, for even the two
or three cases where the acceptor has been held liable upon bills altered by the
drawer are in no real sense contra; in such case the acceptance is simply an
*agreement to pay according to the drawer's order as in any case. See Langton v.
Lazarus, 5 M & W 629 (Exch. 1839) and discussion, Bigelow, Alteration of
,Yegotiable Instruments (1893) 7 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7, 8. The decisions subsequent to the adoption of the act have been in accord. Interstate Trust Co. v.
United States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919) ; National Reserve Bank
v. Corn Exchange Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157 N. Y. Supp. 316 (1916). So much
for stare decisis.
" PATo, DIG. oF LEx. Op. (1926) Op. 108a at p. 1070. But the further point
that because Section 124 N. I. L. provides that upon alteration an instrument is
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certainly is hard to meet. The act is to be construed as a whole, not
phrase by phrase. 15 Moreover, there is no intimation anywhere that
either the draftsman of the American act, or of the earlier English act
after which it was patterned, 16 had any idea that the case law was being changed on this point. In fact quite the contrary. And while it is
true that Dean Ames gratuitously asserted that the act had overthrown
the common law, 17 his construction appears to have derived fully as
much from bitter criticism 18 of the statute as a whole as from any
carefully reasoned study upon the point. So, when the California
court' 9 in 1930 followed the Illinois case upon similar facts, its decision also was widely criticized-and with somewhat greater confi20
dence.
But whether these cases were right or wrong, the banks long since
took measures to meet the situation. Being repulsed in their efforts to
have the act amended 2 ' to provide clearly that certification has to do
only with the original tenor of the paper, a great many proceeded to
qualify their certification stamp to read, "Payable only as originally
drawn."' 22 Let the "law" be what it would they undertook to pay only
according to the original tenor of the instrument. A large number, in
less commercial sections of the country, found that they could refuse
certification entirely,23 except at the request of the drawer, and thus
sidestep the question. Many, of course, continued their former practice relying on insurance and the possibility of beating the case when it
should come up in their states for decision. Not a happy spectacle altogether but yet one quite easily understood!
But there have been several other certification questions to come
avoided as to all parties, except the wrongdoer "and subsequent indorsers," it must

be avoided as to the acceptor, while logical enough, somehow fails to carry much

conviction. It is a little too much to suppose that the draftsman had this precise
case in mind when the section was framed.
Or at least so we are told. Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of
"Interpretingthe N. I. L. (1931) 6 TULANE L. REV. 1.
" See, CHALMERS, BILLS OF EXCHANCE (9th ed. 1927) 214.
' The Negotiable Ins ruinents Law (1900) 14 HARv. L. Rzv. 241, 243 and see
the earlier discussion upon "principle": The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1891) 4
HARv. L. REv. 297, 306-307.
' See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Bank Collection Act (1935) 9 TULANE L.
Rxv. 378 at 388.
"Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 292 Pac. 281 (Cal.
App. 1930).
See particularly Greely, The Effect of Acceptance of an Altered Bill (1933)
27 ILL. L. REv. 519 and a very good note in (1930) 19 CALIF. L. REv. 210.
1For
a discussion of this effort on the part of the General Counsel of the
,American Banker's Association see, PATON, DIG. OF LEGAL Op. (1926) Op. 108a,
p. 1071.
' Or words to similar effect. This statement is based upon recent correspondence with a large number of banks throughout the country.
See Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the
N. L L. (1929) 38 YALE L. J.1047, 1060.
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before the courts in recent years which have given concern to the
banker. One of these, related theoretically to the altered instrument
difficulty has had to do with the irregularly indorsed instrument. It
has been good collection practice-built on rather insecure legal
foundations- - 24 for a drawee bank to which such paper is presented by
mail or through the clearing house for payment to certify it, although
it would be unwilling to make payment. By so doing the drawer's account is embargoed, indeed the drawer may 'be discharged upon the
paper, 25 while it is being returned for proper indorsement. In most
cases this serves to speed up and make more certain the collection process. 26 But when the needed indorsement is not forthcoming-and this
may happen for a variety of reasons-the extent of the bank's obligation upon its certification is again a matter of doubt.
The New York courts have been inclined to say upon these facts
2
that "a new contract was made 'between the bank and the holder.1 7
In the early Freund case 28 the transaction was visualized as an assignment of a chose in action, the certification constituting the bank's, or
debtor's, assent. And from this it followed, without citation of chose
in action authority, that the bank had, at its peril, elected to pay the person procuring certification. As it happened in the particular case the
drawer had no complaint except that he had given the paper to the
payee for his accommodation and, though the latter had pledged it
upon a prior indebtedness, apparently contrary to the drawer's private
expectations, that was a legitimate use of the instrument. The bank, on
its part, had no personal reason for not making payment. This was
scarcely a case upon which the drawer could hold the bank responsible
for having paid according to its certification, if he could ever recover
in such case. But, however carefully the case may be limited technically, the impression created was again that certification speaks as
of the date of the certification, a theory consistent with the view of the
California and Illinois courts mentioned above in the alteration cases.
"'In an era of bank failures it may actually be more dangerous for the collecting
agent to accept a bank's certification than to receive the paper back unpaid, particularly since upon certification for an owner of the paper all secondary parties
are discharged. The authorities holding that an agent in possession of an unaccepted time bill must present for acceptance are not necessarily in point for
there the secondary parties would continue liable even after acceptance. Exchange
Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 276, 5 Sup. Ct. 141, 28 L. ed. 722 (1884).
'If in fact the person presenting the check is its owner or an agent on his
behalf. Sec. 188 N. I. L.
It is proposed, in the Uniform Bank Collection Act now being prepared,
expressly to authorize the practice in the interest of speeding the collection process.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMuISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1934)

162.

' Meuer v. Phenix Nat. Bank, 94 App. Div. 331 at 335, 88 N. Y. S.83 at 83
(1904).
' Freund v. Importers and Traders Nat. Bank, 76 N. Y. 352 (1879).
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It is necessary, therefore, to examine somewhat more closely into
the nature of this "peril" to the certifying boanker. Shortly after the
Freund case was decided, the New York court itself relieved the apparent burden somewhat by differentiating the case where certification
was procured by the drawer.2 9 There, the court said, the bank's undertaking must be deemed conditional upon the payee's indorsement
'being obtained, the paper being drawn payable to his order. This obviously was a very strained position, for a good faith purchaser should
at least be permitted to prove his title in court, even in the absence
of indorsement.30 But the serious case apparently controlled by these
decisions had to do with the forged or unauthorized indorsement, for
it would seem to follow that the apparent holder upon obtaining certification could require payment regardless of title, as upon a new contract. If that were to be the case certification would indeed be perilous.
But, as pointed out, the Freund case did not actually go so far and no
court since, with the missing indorsement case before it, has ever
so decided. In the forged indorsement case, moreover, where certification has been procured by a purported holder subsequent to the forgery,
it has been consistently held that the bank's undertaking is not enas against a
forceable;31 in fact it may be completely avoided even
32
certified.
as
item
the
of
purchaser
fide
bona
subsequent
Actually, therefore, the risk to the bank certifying an irregularly indorsed instrument does not run to the apparent holder at all, as suggested by these courts, but to the drawer. The wrong, where there
is a wrong, consists in charging the drawer's account without authority,
and for so doing the bank can be held liable on familiar principles for
the ensuing loss. 3 3

With one indorsement missing, certification ob-

viously could not be said to have been made in due course. But, how-'
ever that may be, the "peril" seemed sufficiently real to require action
34
when, in 1920, the New York court again asserted, though much more
35
guardedly than before , that the drawee upon certification is liable to
Lynch v. First Nat. Bank of Jersey City, 107 N. Y. 179, 13 N. E. 775 (1887).

'At times it becomes physically impossible actually to indorse paper. In such
case court proceedings to establish title should be sufficient to allow recovery in
the absence of any other defense.
See, for example, State Bank v. Mid-City Bank, 295 IIl. 599, 129 N. E. 428
(1921); see also Gasper v. Security State Bank, 109 Neb. 495, 191 N. E. 654
(1922).
Sec. 23 N. I. L.
' See MoasE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §458.
" Lipten v. Columbia Trust Co., 194 App. Div. 384, 185 N. Y. Supp. 198 (1920).
Ibid., p. 391, 392 "There being no obligation on the part of the drawee to
certify a check, there is no hardship in holding it liable to the lawful owner if it
sees fit to certify a check payable to order after it has been transferred without the
indorsement of the payee, and in the absence of fraud, forgery or inistake in, certifying, it is well settled that it is so liable.. .. "
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the person procuring certification, whether or not he has the payee's indorsement. The general counsel for the American Banker's Association recommended widespread recourse to contract again as a safeguard. 36 As a matter of fact many banks, possibly as a consequence
of the Freund case, had long before incorporated into their certification stamps the phrase, "\vhen properly indorsed, '' 3" for use on all occasions. The practice is now widely established; one might say it has
become institutional.3"
It may be that banker nervousness on this point derived partly
from knowledge that certifications are on occasion made through error.
So long ago as Price v. Neal3 it has been held as to bills, and the point is
codified as to checks in the N. I. L.,40 that should the drawer's name
turn out to be forged or should a mistake be made as to the adequacy
of his account, the acceptor may nonetheless be required to pay. This
for the good business reason that it is more important that commercial paper be freed of such defences, particularly since the bank can
ordinarily avoid losses of the kind by careful practice, than that abstract justice be done in each individual case. 41 Such at least was Lord
Mansfield's thought upon the matter in 1762. But the banks, or possibly their attorneys only, have steadily resisted this position, though
they have never had sufficient assurance, apparently, to attempt here
also to contract out of liability. Possibly they suspect that a further
qualification inserted in their certification stamp, "payable only if the
drawer's signature is genuine, etc., etc.," would be going too far. At
all events, the holder without indorsement should have given them
42
no concern on this score, for it was early decided in the Goshen case
that he at least could not require the bank to pay in the face of such a
defense. Indeed, the courts have so far departed from the early faith
of Price v. Neal, that the bank is now permitted to go to great lengths
43
to correct its errors.
What is only justice when urged by the drawee, however, may be
something else again when the drawer is involved. Of course he too
PATON, DIG. OF LEGAL OP. (1926) Op. 75a, p. 1059.
' See, for example, Blake v. The Hamilton Dime Savings Bank Company, 79
Ohio St. 189, 87 N. E. 73 (1908), concerning a check certified for the payee in
1903 as follows: "Good for $275.00 when properly endorsed." See also Dorsey v.
Abrams, 85 Pa. 299 (1877).
"'

' See Moore and Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial
'Banking (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 703.
'3 Burr. 1354 (K. B. 1762).
0 Sec. 62, N. I. L.
" An excellent statement of the various rationalizations in support of the rule
is given in First Nat. Bank v. United States Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547

(1921).

"Goshen Nat. Bank v. Bingham, 118 N. Y. 349, 23 N. E. 180 (1890).
"For discussion of the inroads being made upon the Price v. Neal doctrine as
regards certification, see infra note 136.
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has made mistakes-or been defrauded-and issued checks which later
he has wanted to recall. But when he has sought to have payment
stopped, his banker has usually considered it a complete answer to say
quite virtuously that unfortunately the holder has already procured
certification. In other words, as visualized by the courts, perhaps with
some prompting by the banks, when a check is certified for the holder
it is as though the drawer's money is paid out to the holder and at once
44
Of
redeposited on an entirely separate certificate of deposit basis.
course this is fiction but not the less potent for all that. The drawer
has been discharged upon the check 45 and the transaction is closed, so
far as he is concerned. The certified check is too important a commercial instrument to be subjected to hazards of this character, that is, when
it is the drawer's money which is at stake.
Of course, it has been only too clear that the banker who should allow his customer to stop payment upon a certified check would find
himself occupying a position midway between the upper and nether
millstones. He might be liable to the drawer for paying and also to
the holder should he refuse to pay. No banker is comfortable in such
a situation, particularly since he regards check paying at best as little
more than a necessary courtesy extended to his customer, a service performed gratuitously or nearly so. And it must be said that the courts
on their part have been careful to extricate the banker from any such
46
position where possible. In the early Freund case, discussed above,
the bank was held to be under no obligation to the drawer to stop payment even though the person procuring certification did not have the
payee's indorsement and so could not be a holder in due course. The
recent cases, almost without exception, have taken an equally satisfac47
tory banker position.
"It is interesting to compare this "as though" argument as it comes up in
the constructive trust setting. Where a collecting bank receives payment by check
upon itself some courts say the case is "as though" the bank first paid the check
and then received the money back again, wherefore its estate has been augmented
to that extent and a preferred claim can be allowed. Others say, more coldly,
that no such transaction actually took place. See Turner, Bank Collections-The
Direct Routing Practice (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 468, 487.
Sec. 188, N. I. L.
"Freund v. Importers and Traders Nat. Bank, 76 N. Y. 352 (1879), cited
supra note 28.
""See Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 213 N. Y. 301, 107 N. E. 693
(1915) (drawer sought to assert set-off against payee); Bulliet v. Allegheny
Trust Co., 284 Pa. 561, 131 Atl. 471 (1925) (drawer attempted to stop because
of irregularity in transaction with payee). For earlier cases denying stop payment on these facts see, Meridian Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33
N. E. 247, 34 N. E. 608 (1893) ; Central Guaranty Trust Co. v. White, 206 Pa.
611, 56 AtI. 76 (1903) (denying stop payment "in absence of fraud"). See further,
notq 58 infra.
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The New Jersey court, in the Tinws Square case, 48 however, became
unduly enamored of the idea that the bank really pays out the drawer's
money, when it certifies a check for the holder. Conversely, it reasoned,
certification for the drawer obviously could not be pictured quite
that way. Wherefore it followed, in the court's opinion, that a drawer's
defense of fraud or failure of consideration would be "open both to
him and to the bank" 40 were the drawer rather than the holder to have
procured certification. This was in 1909. In 1918 the Missouri court, 0
with a case before it where the drawer had procured certification,
ruled that the drawee bank might interplead holder and drawer, thus
for the first time actually making the drawer's defenses available against
a holder. And then, in 1923, the New Jersey court, in the Sutter case,51
had the question squarely presented whether the drawee could be held
liable to the drawer for refusing to recognize the drawer's stop order.
The court chose to approve the earlier dictum in the Times Square case,
but actually gave judgment for the bank since, as it stated, the drawer
had failed to show the extent of his injury at the hands of the payee,
or that he had been injured at all.
The fat was in the fire once more. The general counsel of the
New Jersey Banker's Association was in something of a quandary
what to advise. If the bank must honor its customer's stop payment
orders where he has procured certification, the bank seemingly could
not demand indemnity. It was accordingly suggested either that the
banks should discontinue certifying checks for the drawer entirely-issuing their cashier's checks instead-or that legislation be obtained to
reverse the holding in the Sutter case. 5 2

The point caused much con-

cern in commercial banking circles, the truly dark days to come ten
years later not being even dimly imagined as yet. At all events, the New
Jersey legislature very promptly and obediently passed a brief statute
reading "No bank or trust company shall stop payment of any check
certified by such bank or trust company at the request of the drawer";
' Times Square Automobile Co. v. Rutherford Nat. Bank, 77 N. J. L. 649,
73 Atl. 479 (1909). To the same effect, Jones v. -Nat. Bank of North Hudson, 95
N. J. L. 376, 113 Atl. 702 (1920).
Ibid., p. 650.
Bathgate v. Exchange Bank of Chula, 199 Mo. App. 583, 205 S. W. 875
(1918). An even stronger case was McGinn v. Interstate Nat. Bank, 178 Mo. App.
347, 166 S.W. 345 (1914) where the bank was allowed to interplead the drawer
of a certified check as against the assignee of cashier's checks given to the payee
of the certified check by way of payment. The issue was fraud. Two years after
the Bathgate case the Kansas court refused interpleader in a more or less similar
situation. McAdoo v. The Farmer's State Bank of Zanda, 106 Kan. 662, 189 Pac.
155 (1920). And see, Herrmann Furniture & Plumber's Cabinet Works v. German Exchange Bank, 87 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1904).
"Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 95 N. J.Eq. 44, 122 Atl. 381 (1923). See notes
in (1924) 22 MicH. L. REv. 367 and (1924) 72 UNiv. OF PA. L. REv. 318.
1 PATON, DIG. OF LEG.Op. (1926) Op. 49a, p. 1049.
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and further, it evidently having occurred to the draftsman that no penalty was provided for a violation of this provision, that "the certification
of any check at the request of the drawer shall be of the same effect as
if said check bad been certified at the request of the holder thereof."'5 3
That seems to have taken care of the situation in New Jersey.
The situation in other states continued uncertain. First the banker
was advised to discontinue certifying for the holder, in order to avoid
the alteration risks put upon him by the Illinois and California decisions,
and next to refuse to certify for the drawer, in order to avoid being
caught between two fires should the drawer order payment stopped. If
this advice were all followed, certification would become a thing of
the past. And it is true that there is no very obvious way of escape open
to the banker to contract out of responsibility, unless, indeed, the drawer
should be requested, when his item is certified, to waive any privilege
of stopping payment. 54 At all events some banks do absolutely refuse
to certify for the drawer, preferring to issue their cashier's check instead. 5 5 Many banks indicate upon their certification stamps, or in any
case upon their records, whether certification was for holder or for
drawer.5 6 This merely assumes that the distinction raised by the New
Jersey court may be followed in other states and serves to provide
the bank with the necessary information to determine whether a stop
order must be obeyed. On the .whole the result is confusion.
It will not bring certainty forthwith to do so, but still it should be
pointed out that the court in both New Jersey decisions appears to
have misconceived the situation. After all, stop payment as applied to
a certified or ccepted item is a misnomer, technically speaking. The
question is purely one of what defenses are to be available to the acceptor when sued by the holder. The court did not notice the well
established doctrine that a primary party, having no defense of his own
upon the paper, is not privileged ordinarily to set up a defense personal
to a secondary party against the holder.57 That is a matter for such
' L. 1925, C 115, p. 333.

"' Probably such a provision would be enforceable in view of the more recent
decisions upon stop-payment waivers. See, Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152,
167 N. E. 203 (1929) discussed in (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 542. Upon the question of
stop payments of uncertified paper see Moore, Sussman and Brand, Stop Payment
Orders (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 817, 1198.
' Turner, loc. cit., supra note 23.
A practice has grown up in recent years, also, to photostat each check upon
payment. It would seem preferable to photostat upon certification for, while this
would not show for whom it was certified, it would provide very valuable information in case the instrument were subsequently lost or altered. After all the
bank has no voucher in its possession upon certification to justify its charge to
the drawer's account. See discussion, Mussey v. Eagle Bank, cited infra note 94.
' Section 58 N. I. L. is in point if, upon acceptance or certification, the drawee
becomes a primary party and, in effect, the drawer and payee may be regarded
as first and second indorsers, respectively. There is then no question but that
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parties to adjust between themselves, unless indeed the holder has
obtained the paper by fraud or has an otherwise defective title5 8 In
such later case payment by the bank would not be in due course, 0 and
it would seem a notice given to it of such facts, irrespective of whether
drawer or payee had the paper certified, 60 must be given heed. This is
little more than to say that the age old law relative to constructive trusts
applies to bankers as well as to others. But except in this limited situafailure of consideration arising in the transaction between the secondary parties
would not be available as a defense to the drawer. That it is usual to regard
the parties in substantially this position upon acceptance, see Haddock, Blanchard
& Co., Inc., v. Haddock, 192 N. Y. 499, 85 N. E. 682 (1908).
' Defective title is defined in §55 N. I. L. Possibly a majority of courts
'hold, even here, that this affords no defense -to the maker and acceptor. Prouty
v. Roberts, 6 Cush. 19 (Mass. 1850) ; Kinney v. Kruse, 28 Wis. 183 (1871). There
certainly are a number of well reasoned cases, however, holding that such defenses are in fact available. See particularly Parsons v. Utica Cement Co., 82
Conn. 333, 73 Atl. 785 (1909) ; Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 11 N. D. 10, 88
N. W. 724 (1902) (cashier's check) ; Merchants Exch. Nat. Bank v. New Brunswick Say. Inst., 33 N. J. L. 170 (1868). In this last case the court said: "To
hold otherwise would be, in effect, to admit that a court of justice may sometimes, knowingly, permit itself to be used in furtherance of a premeditated fraud."
In Wilson v. Mid-West State Bank, 193 Ia. 311, 186 N. W. 891 (1922) the drawer
gave a $1,000 check for 15 gallons of whiskey, which turned out to be Missouri
River water "without a kick." The court granted the drawer an injunction to
restrain payment by the bank and held that the transferee had the burden of
proving himself a holder in due course-a difficult matter since the consideration
was a small amount of cash plus a past indebtedness arising out of "the noble
game of craps." This notwithstanding it was the payee who had procured the
certification.
I Looked at from this angle it would seem that the Prouty v. Roberts doctrine
can no longer be sustained, for Section 88 N. I. L. provides that payment is
made in due course only when made to the holder and "without notice that his
title is defective." Surely it is not to be expected that the drawee may not assert
the holder's fraud as a defense and yet, if he pays the holder, continue liable to the
drawer. See discussion, BIGELow, BILLs, NOTES AND CHECxS (3rd ed. 1928) §496
and note.
Even picturing the transaction of certification for the holder as a payment
of the drawer's funds to the holder and a redeposit of them, there is no reason
at all on the "adverse claim" decisions why the repayment of this amount cannot
be stopped-assuming the payee obtained the check or the money in fraud. See,
for example, Shotwell v. Sioux Falls Savings Bank, 34 S. D. 109, 147 N. W. 288
(1914). And there is considerable support for the position in the certified check
cases. In Greenberg v. World Exchange Bank, 227 App. Div. 413, 237 N. Y.
Supp. 200 (1929) the drawer of a check certified for the payee was substituted
as party defendant to plead his defense of fraud against the payee. And see,
Marie Antoinette Realty Co. v. Yorkville Bank, 123 Misc. Rep. 522, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (1924) ; McGinn v. Interstate Nat. Bank, 178 Mo. App. 347, 166 S. W.
345 (1914). Even the case of Blake v. Hamilton Dime Savings Bank, 79 Ohio
St. 189, 87 N. E. 73 (1908) is not a real exception, for there the drawer was
endeavoring to stop payment of a check certified for the payee, not to set up any
fraud against himself, but the fraud of the transferee against the payee, a Prouty
v. Roberts situation. Of course a great deal of the uncertainty lies in the vagueness of the different categories, which range all the way from theft, through
various degrees of fraud and duress, to simple failure of consideration. At all
events if the drawer has procured the certification it is not at all clear that, even
in New Jersey where the statute says, he may no longer stop payment, it follows
that the bank would be discharged if it paid a check to a holder with full knowledge of his fraud.
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tion, 6 ' stop payment has no application to the certified check, that is,
technically speaking.
One recent certification skirmish between bank and depositor, at
least, has resulted in complete victory to the bank, thanks probably in
large part to this whole accumulation of uncertainties. The banker
may say, rather arbitrarily as noticed above, that hereafter he will refuse to certify for the holder, but it is another matter to square action
of that sort with his obligation to the drawer. Of course, the banker has
long cultivated the view that he is under no obligation to the drawer to
certify the latter's paper.62 According to the banker's version of the
deposit contract it is merely that the bank will pay upon demand, not
certify, but the case authority in support of his position has been almost
nil. And, on the other hand, the Negotiable Instruments Law provideS6 3 that the drawer undertakes that his "instrument will be accepted
or paid, or both, according to its tenor. . .

."

Since "certification" is

expressly made "equivalent to an acceptance"6 4 it would seem to follow inescapably that the drawer at least could be held directly liable
to the holder as upon a dishonor in case the bank should refuse certification.
The danger to the banker from this latter line of reasoning was all
too obvious, for it would seem to follow that the drawer, if held upon
the paper, might in turn hold the banker liable for injury to his credit.
Actions by drawers for slander of Credit, though not on these facts,
have resulted in serious losses to the banker in the past. 65 Accordingly, in 1928, a case appeared before the New York court, 66 almost as
if by design, to test the question, indirectly. It seems a check holder
demanded certification in due form from the drawee bank and, upon
refusal, without anything being said about payment, gave notice of the
facts to the drawer and brought suit. The court, in the face of the express provisions of the statute, gave judgment for the defendant. It
"A similar situation is presented where the bank which has issued a commercial letter of credit is ordered by the buyer to stop payment to the seller
because of alleged defects in the goods shipped. The New York court in O'Meara
v. National Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925) refused to permit
such a defense to be interposed. See discussion, Turner, Letters of Credit as
Negotiable Instruments (1926) 36 YALE L. J.245, 252. It should be noted that
'on its facts this was probably a failure of consideration case; the court carefully
refrained from saying what it would do in a case of fraud, as where the seller
were to present forged documents.
'All the text writers appear to have echoed this view. See BIGELow, BiLLs,
NoTEs AND CHECKS (3rd ed. 1928) §204. The reason given here is that the check
by its terms does not call for certification but payment, a reason which applies
equally, of course, to the terms of the bill of exchange.
Sec. 61, N. I. L.
Sec. 187, N. I. L.
',Supra note 33.
'Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N. Y. 386, 164 N. E. 326 (1928). Cf. Gregg v. George,
16 Kans. 546 (1876).
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preferred to follow its early lower court decision which in fact involved a suit upon the underlying consideration for which the check
was given67 In so doing it adopted the court's statement that the
banker is under no duty to his customer to certify paper, as stating
"the" common law contract. It thus ignored the whole ensuing development in the practice of certifying checks. 68 It ignored further the
fact that it was setting a trap for the unwary holder who might reasonably assume that a refusal to certify was in fact a dishonor and, by
not going through the further formality of demanding payment, release the drawer.
There may have been substantial practical reasons for the decision.
Indeed, the lower court, intimated as much in its suggestion that
change, if desirable, should come by legislation, "at which time the
rights of all parties could be adequately protected." What situation
the court had in mind, is necessarily conjectural. That many banks will
not certify very small checks for reasons of economy would seem a
case de minimus. That a bank should not be required to certify a carelessly drawn check could easily be covered by decision. In fact a great
many banks now use a protectograph to show the exact amount for
which they certify, thus minimizing any reason for refusal on that
score. There may be other considerations, but they certainly are not
obvious. What the decision actually did, however, was to give the
banker a free hand, as he wanted, to combat decisions such as the
Illinois and California holdings above discussed. Taking a long view
of the matter the decision was not particularly statesmanlike.
From this brief review of current 'certification troubles one gets the
impression that the banks have been running before their shadows. Of
course there is no denying that there have been some real risks involved, but in the hurry to avoid them the certified check itself has
been unduly battered around. There has been very little concern regarding the function which certification performs in modern commercial affairs, nor, one suspects, much understanding of how it has come
to be. As to the future, it has been enough, apparently, that the evil
of the moment be avoided; tomorrow may take care of itself.
"Bradford v. Fox, 39 Barb. 203 (N. Y. 1863). Apart from a dictum in Minot
v. Russ, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N. E. 489 (1892) this is the only authority at all near
the point. The Wachtel case was quite generally approved in the reviews: (1927)
27 CoL. L. IEv. 735; (1929) 28 MicH. L. REv. 74; (1928) 77 UNIv. OF PA. L. IRv.
126 and (1929) 15 VA. L. REv. 683. See contra (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 112.
"The subsequently developed picture of certification at the request of the
holder as being "really" a payment, discharging the drawer, was not mentioned.
On this theory all that the holder asked for was payment and it would seem
to follow that a refusal to so pay was a dishonor. It still could have been made
a separate question whether the bank should be liable to the drawer.
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TH EARLY ENVIRONMENT
Before any solution of current certification problems can well be
attempted, some investigation of antecedents is essential. There is a
certain continuity in the development of an institution, however unpredictable its course may appear to be. The English banking practice
of "marking" checks, first noticed in the case of Robson v. Bennett 0
in 1810, appears to have been the start of the thing. Marked checks,
when presented for payment the following day, were entitled to preference over other checks of the drawer actually presented at the same
time. 70 The practice, thus, to begin with was merely an aid in the
collection of checks, a function which it still serves, as mentioned above,
in the case of irregularly indorsed paper. Moreover, the thing was
deemed private to bankers, as perhaps might be expected. The Robson
case decided that "marking" did not affect the drawer's liability,7 1
and as for the drawee, its obligation was generally thought to run
73
only in favor of bankers, 72 and that for a very limited period.
In England only one step in the direction of a widespread use of
the certified, or marked, check was made. The drawer of a check, intending to use it to take up documents, might have it "marked" by the
drawee as an assurance that it was drawn against actual deposits. But
even this use gave way in 1905, the banker preferring to issue his own
2 Taunt. 388 (C. P. 1810). For the operation of the marked cheque in con-

nection with the clearings, see also Pollard v. Bank of England, 25 L. T. R. 415

(Q. B. 1871).

;0 That the drawee might not give priority to its own claims ahead of those of
other persons presenting paper for payment was reasonably clear. Kilsby v. Wil'hams, 5 B. & Ald. 815 (K. B. 1822). The preference to the banking fraternity

'holding "marked" checks seems not to have been questioned.

' On the day the "check," as it was then spelled even in England, was drawn
it was presented to the drawee by a collecting bank, but since it was after 4 P.m. it
was marked for payment at the clearing house the next morning. The drawer
claimed to be discharged because of failure on the part of the collecting bank to
make due presentment, for it was presented to the drawee at the clearing house
and not at the drawee's counter. The court construed the mark as an acceptance
to pay at a particular place, and found that presentment at the clearing house
was equivalent to presentment at the banking house. The court neither saw nor
considered the question to arise over sixty years later in America as to whether
mere marking at the request of the holder relased the drawer. See infra note 100.
' Judge Cockburn, in Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 10 Exch. 337, 352 (1875),
speaking of the growth of commercial customs in general, observed, "A custom
has grown up among bankers themselves of marking cheques as good for the
purpose of clearance, by which they become bound to one another!' The opinion
that the obligation runs to bankers only is based on Bills of Exchange Act, s. 17
(2). 1 HART, LAW OF BANKING (4th ed. 1931) 341. But if the banker were to sign
as well as mark, it would be an acceptance within the Act. BYLES, BILLs OF ExCHANGE (19th ed. 1931) 21, 22.
PAcET, THE LAW OF BANKING (4th ed. 1930) 169. Although it does not
appear to have been settled in England, a week has been regarded in Scotland
as a reasonable time for the bank to retain funds to meet the marked cheque.
For a general discussion of the marked cheque in England, see id. pp. 164-169.
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"transfer check" instead7 4 However, there was at least one real obstacle to an extensive development of certification in England, again
a purely fortuitous one; the statute7 5 giving the Bank of England a
limited monopoly of note issue was too broadly drawn. It provided in
effect that no bank doing business within sixty-five miles of London
should become obligated upon bills or notes payable within less than
six months. This statute was early, and literally, construed to forbid acceptance of short term drafts, even when drawn against actual deposits. 7 6 At all events the certified check, thus for all practical purposes

excluded from the London district, never obtained a foothold there or
77
elsewhere in England.
It is difficult to give any precise date when the practice of certifying checks commenced in this country-and even more to say what the
consequences of certification were understood to be. Writing in 1845,
on the law of bills, notes and checks, so scholarly an authority as Mr.
Justice Story omits any mention of certification. 78 In fact, inferentially
at least, he repeats his statement,7 9 made in 1843 in the case of Matter
" HART, op. cit., supra note 72, at 341, referring to a resolution of the London Clearing Bankers. Since 1905 this use of the marked cheques has become
comparatively rare. Id. at 587.
'3 & 4 W. 4, c. 98 (1833).
" Bank of England v. Anderson, 2 Keen 328 (Rolls Ct. 1837). The case involved a twenty-one-day draft drawn on a London bank by a country banker.
It was strenuously argued, but to no avail, that since the draft was drawn
against actual deposits it was not in violation of the statute.
Certification, however, is a recognized practice in Canada and Newfoundland,
following in general the rules developed in the United States. FALCONBR1DGE,
BANKING AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE (4th ed. 1929) 858 et seq.
The Uniform Cheque Law (C. 294. M. 137. 1931. II B.), approved at the International Conference for the Unification of the Laws of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, held at Geneva under the auspices of the League of
Nations in 1931, and now enacted in many European countries, does not permit
:the acceptance of cheques. (§4). The underlying theory is that the real nature
bf a cheque calls for prompt payment and not acceptance. (Cf. REcORDS OF THE
CONFERENCE n. 32). However, this rule, based on doctrinaire preconceptions, is
to some extent nullified by Article 6 of Annex II which allows, "Each of the
High Contracting Parties" to "provide that a drawee may write on the cheque
a statement of certification, confirmation, visa, or other equivalent declaration, provided that such statement shall not operate as an acceptance, and may also determine the legal effect thereof." Pursuant to this provision, Section 6 of the
Einfuehrungesetz sum German Scheckgesetz of August 14, 1931, permits the
Reichsbank, but no other bank, to certify cheques. The certification, however,
is not an acceptance, for the Reichsbank is discharged from liability if the cheque
is not presented for payment within "the time of presentation" which, for inland cheques, is eight days after the drawing. Practically, but not legally, it
amounts to a discharge of secondary parties. Under similar rules, and with similar effect, all the banks of Scandinavian countries are permitted to certify cheques.
KESSLER, SCECKGESETZ (1934) Art. 4 (1 to 3), p.47 et seq.; FELLER, Unificaliom
of Laws Concerning Checks (1932) 44 HARV. L. Rsv. 668, 679.
' STORY, PROMISsORY NOTrES (1st ed. 1845), in which he includes his discussion of checks. His previous work on Bills of Exchange, published in 1843, does
not consider the check.
"STORY, PROMISSORY NOTES (1st ed. 1845) 619. After stating that days of
grace are not allowed, it is said "In any other view, the check might be presented
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of Brown,80 that "checks are never presentable for mere acceptance,
There is reason to believe, however, that
but only for payment." 8'
the practice was already more or less general, for in the very year of
publication certified checks were before the courts in Massachusetts 8 2
and in Alabama.83 Moreover, as attested by the Massachusetts case,
certification had already come to mean more than was implied by the
marking practice in England. The bank was relieved of an obligation
to the holder only because its teller was deemed to be without authority
to certify.8 4 This line of banker defense was slow in giving way,
thus serving as a shock absorber while the institution was taking shape.8 5
Even before this, in 1839, Justice Cowen, making possibly the first
comment of an American court of record upon the practice of marking
checks for presentation through the clearing house, said that it was
considered "equivalent to acceptance,"'8 6 and in 1842 a New York court
so held.87 While the actual decision, since it involved bankers only,
may have gone no farther than an English court might have gone, the
concept that, as in the case of acceptance, certification "equally gives
for, and require, acceptance; and yet it is understood that such acceptance is never

called for, or given."
'2 Story's Cir. Ct.

Rep. 502 (1843), quoted in footnote STORY, op. cit., supra
note 79, at 621.
8
'Id. at 512.
" Mussey v. Eagle Bank, 9 Metc. 306 (Mass. 1845).
'Smith v. Branch Bank, 7 Ala. 880 (1845).
" In this first case the Massachusetts court, alarmed at the prospect of deliberate fraud, denied that the teller had implied authority to certify any checks, in
an opinion which would deny that any single officer had such authority. Farmers
etc. Bank v. Butchers etc. Bank, 14 N. Y. 623 (1856) ; id., 16 N. Y. 125 (1857) ;
id., 28 N. Y. 425 (1857) established the authority of -the teller, and took the position that, while no officer had actual authority to certify checks unless drawn
against adequate deposits (thus ignoring a then more or less prevalent custom
to over-certify as a method of making a loan, discussed infra note 138), still the
innocent holder could not be expected to determine at his peril the sufficiency of
the drawer's account.
The high water mark on the authority issue was reached in Merchants Bank
v. State Bank, 77 U. S. 604, 19 L. ed. 1008 (1870), which held that the cashier,
by virtue of his position as financial officer of the bank, had authority to certify,
while away from the bank, checks totalling $525,000, although it would seem that
it was evident to the payee that the checks were not drawn against deposits. In
Muth v. St. Louis Trust Co., 94 Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978 (1902), the court went
clear back to Mussey v. Eagle Bank, 9 Metc. 306 (Mass. 1845), and denied the
authority of a teller to certify, although the holder could have apparently been
denied recovery because of fraud. See further Peoples Bank v. International
Finance Corp., 30 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929). The cases are collected in
.STEFN, CASES ON AGENCY (1933) §26.
'Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. 372 (N. Y. 1839). The point at issue was
whether the holder could sue the drawer before presentment at the bank. The
opinion is criticized by Story, J., in Matter of Brown, 2 Story's Cir. Ct. Rep. 502
(1843), as drawing too close an analogy between bills and checks.
'T Phoenix Bank v. Bank of America (1842) 1 N. Y. LEG. OBs. 26. This appears to have been the first reported direct holding on certified checks as distinguished from the English "marked cheque."
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currency to the paper,"88 is evidence of a radically different outlook.
The certified check was about to be made a highly important medium
of currency, whether that accorded with the bankers' wishes in the
premises or not.
The case of Willets v. The Phoenix Bank,8 9 decided in 1853, was finally to divorce certification from the English marked check practice. o0
It was argued on behalf of the bank, with considerable justification
in view of the origin of the practice, that it was customary to certify
checks for presentation on the following day only, and that if they
were not so presented the bank might with safety allow the account
to be withdrawn. Its argument was perhaps inspired by the fact that
the drawer had in fact 'been allowed to withdraw his monies. But the
court regarded the obligation of the bank as a matter of more consequence, not dissimilar to the obligation it would incur upon issuance of
its own notes, that is, "an unconditional promise of payment, whenever payment shall be demanded ....,91 Putting the currency idea in
more positive form, Oakley, C. J., said: "The sole and manifest object
of the maker or holder of a check in requiring it to be certified, is to
enable him to use it as money." 91 The proposition that certification
ran in favor of bankers only was scarcely given a hearing.
By this resort to the money analogy the court had definitely put
the certified check upon a new level, at least temporarily, even as in an
earlier day Lord Mansfield had developed the bill of exchange. Possibly, when one considers the unsettled monetary conditions which prevailed during the period when this case was decided, its result may be
said to have been dictated by the times. Representing actual money on
deposit-at least in the public mind-the business community welcomed the certified check as delineated by the court. There was crying need of some form of stable money. By the time of the "greenId. at 27.
2 Duer 121 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1853).
'The notion that it was merely a clearing house device reappeared in Flour
City Nat. Bank v. Traders Nat. Bank, 105 N. Y. 550, 12 N. E. 55 (1887), a case
which without citation of authority held that certification should be limited to
the settlement of accounts between the drawee and the clearing house bank which
had presented the paper.
"Willets v. The Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer' 121 (N. Y. Super Ct.. 1853), at 132.
'It was entirely consistent with this currency aspect for the court in Girard Bank
v. Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. 92 (1862) to hold that the statute of limitations would not start to run against the bank's obligation until demand for payment was made, thus putting it on the basis of the certificate of deposit or bank
note; a view more articulately expressed in Metropolitan Bank v. Jones, 137 Ill.
634, 27 N. E. 533 (1891), which described certification as aialogous to payment
and redeposit. The same currency theory supports the view that a purchaser of
a stolen check two or three years after certification is not subject to defenses
as on an overdue instrument. Nolan v. Bank of Nat. Banking Assn., 67 Barb.

24 (N. Y. 1873).
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back era," following the War between the States, certified checks, registered and payable in gold, circulated as a medium superior to that of the
national currency.9 2 The average circulation in New York City alone
was conservatively estimated in 1870, according to Mr. justice Swayne,
"at not less than one hundred millions of dollars" 93 daily.
Though the certified check had thus "arrived," so to speak, as a
continuing bank obligation, the problem of what to do with the secondary obligations upon the paper was to trouble the courts for many
years. Judge Oakley had advised in the Willets case that upon certification the drawer's account should be immediately charged, after which
the sum in question should "remain as a deposit in the bank to the
credit of the check, and be forever withdrawn from the control.of the
maker, except as a holder of the check." 94 But if the drawer's account was to be charged upon certification as upon payment, the question remained as to the effect of the transaction upon the drawer's
liability. So long as the bank continued solvent, of course, the problem was purely an academic one, but to anyone who looks back across
the troubled history of American banking it is obvious that the question was one which would have to be decided and that shortly.
The issue was first to come before the Illinois court in two cases
decided in 1866. In each, the checks had been certified for the drawer
and delivered by him to the payee, but were not paid owing to the untimely failure of the bank to open its doors next .morning. In the
Bickford case, 95 the court was impressed with the idea that certification is equivalent to acceptance, and, since the drawer of a time bill
is not discharged upon acceptance, it followed that the drawer of a check
continued liable upon certification. The companion case of Rounds v.
Smith 9 encountered greater difficulty. There had been no charge to
: ' See Nolan v. Bank of Nat. Banking Assn., 67 Barb. 24 (N. Y. 1873). Judge
Brady, speaking of the period from 1865 on, states that such certified checks were
used by the mercantile community "as gold." He does not explain what is meant
by "registered," nor whether the obligation to pay in gold was expressed upon the

check.
' See Merchants Bank v. State Bank, 77 U. S. 604, 648, 19 L. ed. 1008, 1019
(1870).
" Willets v. The Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer 121, 131 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1853). Mr.
Justice Swayne in 1870 stated that this had already become the practice "in well

,regulated banks." See Merchants Bank v. State Bank, 77 U. S. 604, 648, 19 L. ed.

1008, 1019 (1870). The necessity of charging the drawer's account was indeed
recognized by the Massachusetts court in Mussey v. Eagle Bank, 9 Metc. 306
(Mass. 1845), but it deemed it an almost insuperable difficulty that the bank
would be without a voucher until the check was paid. This difficulty is actually
greatly accentuated in -the telegraphic certification cases but has given little trouble.
.Garrettson v. No. Atchison Bank, 39 Fed. 163 (C. C. Mo. 1889). Kahn v. Walton,
46 Oh. St. 195, 20 N. E. 203 (1889). Relaying telegram by phone upheld, Selma
Bank v. Webster Co. Bank, 182 Ky. 604, 206 S. W. 870 (1918).
' Bickford v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 42 Ill. 238 (1866).
42 Ill. 245 (1866).
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the drawer's account upon certification; indeed, as the court said,
"the teller made no memorandum of it, except 'in his head,' where it
seems he kept such transactions." 97 The case was thus one for the
jury in the courts view. In fact there had been no charge to the
drawer's account in the Bickford case. 98 At all events, by the next
year, the court in Brown v. Leckie9 9 reached the conclusion that it was
quite immaterial whether the drawer's account had been charged or not.
The only effect of certification, it then said, is to give the check additional currency by adding the obligation of the bank-and the assurance
that the check was drawn against actual funds.
It was not until the panic year of 1873 that the converse case, where
the holder had procured certification, was presented. But in Bank v.
Leach'0 0 the facts were as good as if made to order to present the issue sharply. Certification had been obtained in the morning but presentment for payment, though made in the afternoon, was in vain for the
drawee had suspended meanwhile. It was obviously not possible to
urge that the drawer was discharged by any delay on the holder's part;
the case must turn on the effect of certification. Although there had
been previous dicta to the contrary,' 0 ' the reasoning of the Illinois
cases, supra, seemed to force the conclusion that the drawer continued
liable. And, although the court was evidently again impressed with
the fact that the drawer's account had been charged, a circumstance depriving him of any opportunity to withdraw his funds, it conceded that
a charge would likewise be made in the case of a time bill and there
10 2
the drawer admittedly continues liable nonetheless.
But there were several other ways of reasoning the case. The
court pointed out that the check was due when it was presented, thus
differentiating it from the time bill, and then proceeded to the position, unsupported by prior decisions, that the holder is given no authority
' Id. at 254. The same method was pursued by a teller of a St. Louis bank
as late as 1902. Muth v. St. Louis Tr. Co., 94 Mo. App. 94, 67 S.W. 978 (1902).
'See Rounds v. Smith, 42 Ill. 245, 254 (1866). The court in the Bickford
Case, at 241, said, "The bank is supposed to charge it to the account of the
drawer, and appropriate the funds to the credit of the check."
43 Ill. 497 (1867). In -this case the bank continued solvent but dishonored
the check by refusing to pay cash, offering only to give the holder credit against
the latter's obligation to the bank. The court concluded that this was a dishonor, on the theory that the holder of a check-even of a certified check-is an
agent of the drawer to withdraw funds.
" First Nat. Bank of Jersey City v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350 (1873). Admittedly
reaching its decision "on principle," the court expressed the opinion that if the
drawer again came into possession of the check he would hold the bank not upon
the original deposit but solely upon the check as any other holder.
101 In Andrews v. German Nat. Bank, 56 Tenn. 211 (1872),
the drawer procured certification and was held liable upon the bank's failure the next morning,
but the court expressed the opinion, without amplification, that certification for
the holder would discharge the drawer.
' NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW §61.
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by the drawer to present a check for acceptance. From this the
conclusion was reached, not altogether logically, that the loss must
fall upon the holder if he elects to take certification in lieu of payment. Certification, so far from being "equivalent to acceptance" had
thus become "equivalent to payment."' 0 3 Or, if you prefer, a new
04
contract had been substituted for-not added to-that of the drawer..
Or, as the Tennessee Court put it in 1874, "When the holder ... presents it, it is his own fault if he fails to receive the money."' 0 5 Almost, it would seem, any reason would suffice, provided it served to discharge the drawer.
The point is now "settled law," duly obscured with many reasons.
Still, it is fair to ask: Why in fact did the court depart from the accepted 'bill analogy? How could it say that there was no authority
in the holder to procure certification, in the face of a custom of perhaps
fifty years standing for holders to do just that? Why was it the
holder's "fault" for not obtaining payment, when drawers had known
all this time that a holder might procure certification if he saw fit?
A clew to the answer may lie in the fact that the court was keenly
aware in 1873 that many banks would fail causing large unavoidable
losses to drawers. It chose therefore to force the holder to demand
payment in cash, without stopping to weigh the point that the risk of
unavoidable loss by theft in such alternative, might well come to be
greater than that from bank failure. Nor was any thought given to the
subsequent bona fide purchaser; if the drawer must be discharged, apparently he is discharged as to all parties, whether they know who procured certification or not.
At all events, by 1889, and the next depression, the rule, and especially its reasons, had become so well established that the case of Born
0°
v. Bank of Indianapolis'
caused a considerable furor. This was a
" Judge Allen in 1870 perhaps first used this expression. Smith v. Miller,
43 N. Y. 171, 176 (1870). It was seized upon by a Federal court in 1876 to support the decision that a collecting bank became liable to its depositor as for
money received where it had a check certified, thereby releasing the drawer.
'Essex County Nat. Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193 (C. C. 1876). On
the same theory the collecting bank was held liable to the creditors of the depositor in a garnishment action. Nat. Com. Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 168 (1884).
...
See Boyd v. Nasmith, 17 Ont. 40, 41 (1889), the first Canadian decision on
the point. In holding the drawer discharged upon certification for the holder, the
court said, "When it was presented upon the following day [after certification]
payment must be taken to have been demanded not upon the drawer's original contract, but upon the promise to pay of the bankers which the plaintiffs [holders]
had 0procured to be substituted for it."
" Freeman, J., in French v. Irwin, 63 Tenn. 401, 403 (1874).
123 Ind. 78, 23 N. E. 689 (1889). See also Larson v. Breene, 12 Colo. 480,
21 Pac. 498 (1889). Before this, and also subsequent to the Leach Case, an indorser who had had a check certified was held liable to his transferee. Ivutual
Nat. Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. Ann. 933 (1876).
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case where the drawer, as in the Bickford case, had had the check certified for a payee who would not otherwise receive it. The bank failed before the check could be presented next morning. Were the court to follow the "reasoning" in the Leach case, that certification works a permanent charge to the drawer's account "equivalent to payment," it would
result in discharging the drawer. And after all, it was argued, was not
the certified check received by the business world almost as money on
the faith of the bank's undertaking alone, not that of the drawer? The
court decided to hold the drawer liable. The check was not money;
the drawer had chosen the bank he saw fit to trust; the effect of certification at his request was merely to add,-not substitute-the obligation
of the bank. It remained for the Massachusetts court in 1892,107 with
both situations before it at once, to settle the dialectical difficulty by
saying that the certified check is neither exactly like a certificate of deposit nor yet in all respects the same as an accepted bill of exchange,
it is "a thing sui generis."105 And subsequent courts have continued to
hold the drawer in the one case' 0 9 and to discharge him in the other. 110
In all this debate no one apparently paused to measure the duration
or extent of the drawer's secondary liability. One might suppose from
the criticism"' of the Born case that where he procures certification
he is bound indefinitely as a sort of guarantor of the bank's solvency.
Still, the instrument though certified continues to be a check" 12
Minot v. Russ, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N. E. 489 (1892).
Id. at 460, 31 N. E. at 490.
'See Railway Express Agency v. Thomas, 5 Fed. Supp. 345 (E. D. Mich.
1933) ; Commercial Investment Trust Co. v. Windsor, 197 N. C. 208, 148 S.E. 42
(1929). And see infra note 113. As in Rounds v. Smith, 42 Ill. 245 (1866), the
fact that the payee would not take the check until certified was held immaterial

in Randolph Nat. Bank v. Hornblower, 160 Mass. 401, 35 N. E. 850 (1894);
Davenport v. Palmer, 152 App. Div. 761, 137 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1912), reversed on
atother point, 211 N. Y. 596, 105 N. E. 800 (1914). See further, Gaden v. Newfoundland Savings Bank, [1899] A. C. 281, an English case arising from Newfoundland, and noted in (1899) 106 L. T. 453, 454, where the writer makes a
prophesy which has not been fulfilled: "This is the first reported decision of an
English Court on certified cheques, but it is safe to assume that they will not infrequently be the subject of judicial decision in the luture. The convenience which
has led to the spread of certification on the other side of the Atlantic is likely
to lead to its adoption by business men in this country."
"' Continental
Nat. Bank v. Cornhouse, 37 Ill. App. 475 (1890); McCarty
Bros. v. Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank, 208 Ill. App. 282 (1917); Meridian Nat. Bank
v. Bank of Shelbyville, 7 Ind. App. 322, 36 N. E. 833 (1893) ; Bank of Detroit v.
Currie, 147 Mich. 72, 110 N. W. 499 (1907) ; Cincinnati Oyster Co. v. Nat. Lafayette Bank, 51 Ohio St. 106, 36 N. E. 833 (1894). Warrensburg Assoc. v. Zoll,
83 Mo. 95 (1884), is a seeming, but not actual, exception. But see Central 'Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. The Mirror, 279 N. Y. Supp. 671 (1935).
' There was general discussion of the question: Francis R. Jones, Liability
of the Maker of a Check after Certification (1892) 6 HARV. L. REv. 138; Leslie J.
Tompkins, The Certification of Checks (1902) 41 Am. L. R. (N. S.) 127; also
a communication published (1890) 31 CENT. L. J. 93.
'Andrews v. German Nat. Bank, 56 Tenn. 211, 221 (1872), disapproving the
language which it quotes from Morse, Banks and Banking, "The check ceases in

A BLUE PRINT FOR THE CERTIFIED CHECK
and, according to a rule of long standing, presentment for payment
must be made within a reasonable time or the drawer will be discharged
to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. 113 Which, as translated
somewhat freely by Rugg, C. J., in the recent case of Seager v.
Dauphinee,"14 means that if the holder does not collect his paper
promptly the drawer is completely and forthwith discharged. The
court simply ignored the negative implication of the rule, that the
drawer continues liable to the extent that he has not suffered loss by
the delay, and remitted the holder to his action against the bank to recover that amount at his leisure. 1 5 Not a bad result, 116 though it is
true the court without much warrant forced the holder to forego his
immediate recourse against the drawer. If the drawer's secondary obligation is to continue no longer than is required for prompt collection,
however, there is actually little reason left for giving him an immediate
discharge when it is the holder who procures certification. In view of
the unreality today of the requirement that the holder should demand
fact to be a check, and becomes a promise to pay. Accordingly the rules which
govern a check no longer govern this instrument."
. 'Chancellor Kent, writing in 1828 (3 KENT's Comm. (1st ed. 1828) 58) traces
the rule as to checks in general no further back than his own decision in Conroy
v. Warren, 3 Johns. Cas. 259 (N. Y. 1802), where he appears to reach his conclusion without prior authority. The drawer had withdrawn his account after
giving the check. Sec. 186 N. I. L. codifies the common law rule, "A check must
be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer
will be discharged from liability to the extent of the loss caused by the delay."
It seems generally to have been taken for granted that except in so far as he
suffers loss, the drawer of a check remains liable indefinitely or until the statute
of limitations has run. However, a check is a demand bill and subject to the rules
applying to demand bills, except as otherwise provided. Sec. 185. Under §71
the drawer of a demand bill is discharged if it is not presented within a reasonable time after the last negotiation, without reference to any loss. Technically,
therefore, two periods of reasonable time are set up, one measured from the
time of issue of the check and the other from -the time of the last negotiation,
with different results.
284 Mass. 96, 187 N. E. 94 (1933). The check, certified for the drawer,
was not presented until after the lapse of at least three days more than would
have been allowed for the presentment of an uncertified check. This is possibly
the only direct holding in the case of a certified check; but several cases contain
dicta that to charge the drawer of a certified check presentment must be made, as
upon an ordinary check, before the close of business of the day after it is received, where bank and payee are in the same town. Bickford v. First Nat. Bank
of Chicago, 42 Ill. 238 (1866); Andrews v. German Nat. Bank, 56 Tenn. 211

(1872).

1 The matter is of further importance to the holder where, though drawer
and holder are within the same jurisdiction, the bank is in another. Of course
the alternative, in a suit against the drawer, of asking the jury to determine
what might ultimately be paid out upon the bank's liquidation is not exactly scientific. It has been proposed to amend §186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
to clarify the matter. See HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1933) 204.
' Section 74 (3) of the English Bills of Exchange Act provides for the same
effect in the case of the uncertified cheque, by giving the holder a claim against
the bank to the extent to which the drawer is discharged.
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cash the drawer might well be asked to stand sponsor of his bank at
least so long. nT7 Both cases could then be put on the same footing,
but of course this would nullify much of the mental effort in this connection on the part of judge and lawyer during the last half century,
and for that reason is simply unthinkable.
All of which prompts an inquiry whether the certified check is
actually so sui generis as supposed, if the question may be so expressed.
A check is a bill of exchange drawn upon a bank payable upon demand,
at least that is the way the draftsman of the N. I. L. conceived of it

in the 90's.118 As late as 1860, however, the question was still in issue, when the court in Keene v. Beard'" had to decide whether or not
an indorser of a check should be liable to a remote indorsee, as upon a
bill of exchange. And, of course, as pointed out above, the Willets
case' 20 had only a few years before definitely put the bank's certification obligation upon the same footing as that of an acceptance of a bill.
It was clearly therefore not going beyond the prior case law to generalize the matter in the N. I. L., although it was deemed necessary to
make express exception to provide for certain supposed differences.
Even earlier in the century many courts had said, rather loosely,
that the check was a bill of exchange,' 2 ' notwithstanding the view
was disapproved by Mr. Justice Story. 122 He saw many differences
and his views carried weight, enough at least to delay complete identification of the two for a time. One was entitled to days of grace the
other not, a distinction, which if ever valid,1 23 is now of no moment
since days of grace have been abolished.' 24 One was drawn against
17 At least the holder may inquire whether the drawer is good without discharging him. Simpson v. Pacific, etc., Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 143 (1872). After all,
one of the principal functions of a bill or check is to keep money out of circulation. This purpose would be furthered by permitting the holder to have the
check certified and collected through usual banking channels, without making it
an automatic discharge of the drawer.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §185.
N

8 C. B. (N. S.) 372, 380 (1860). The court supported the conclusion that
the indorser was liable by resort -to the analogy with the bill of exchange, and in
comparing the two observed, "though in practice the banker does not accept the
draft [check] he might for ought I know do so."
2
'Willets v. The Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer 121 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1853).
"I Upon the issue of whether the drawer could be sued before presentment to
the bank, Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 Johns. Gas. 484, 490 (N. Y. 1802) ; Harker v.
Anderson, 21 Wend. 372 (N. Y. 1839). Upon the question of whether it could
be accepted orally, Barnet v. Smith, 10 Foster 256 (N. H. 1855).
STORY, PROMISSORY NoTEs (1845) 621.

'Id. at 616, where this is cited as a distinction between bills and checks.
'However, in his work on Bills of Exchange (1843) 418, he states that no days
of grace were allowed on demand bills, although they were allowed on sight bills.
The distinction, therefore, would seem to be between demand bills or checks and
time bills.

N.GoTiABL INsTRUMENTs LAW §85.
aind sight bills is eliminated by §7.

The distinction between demand bills

A BLUE PRINT FOR THE CERTIFIED CHECK
"money in bank" the other against general credit, another supposed difference not true in fact, for bank deposits as every one knows today
are not so much made, as created by loan. Again, the drawer of a
check was to be regarded as a principal debtor 25 and, as the N. I. L.
12 6
now provides, not to be wholly discharged by delay in presentment,
while the drawer of a bill was something else again. Here too the
difference was perhaps only one of words for the drawer of a bill is
surely as much a principal debtor in his dealings with the payee as is
the drawer of a check-and both are, or should be, creditors of the
drawee. Moreover, it is not at all clear that even the drawer of a bill
is wholly discharged by delay in presentment,' 2 7 though to concede this
may require some restatement of widely accepted principles to the contrary.
'As expressed by Nisbet, J., "The drawer of a check is not a surety, but a
principal debtor; he is an original undertaker to pay. . . . [The check] is an
appropriation of so much money, belonging to the drawer in the hands of the
drawee, to the holder, there to remain until called for." Whereupon he reasoned
that the drawer had no right to complain of delay unless there had been some
injury. Daniels v. Kyles, 1 Ga. 304, 305 (1846).

'

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

§186.

' Text writers generally state the rule to be that failure to make due presentment of a bill discharges the drawer both upon the bill and upon the underlying
consideration, citing some authority and much dicta. Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171
(1870) ; 3 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §1467; BYLES, BILLS
OF EXCHANGE (19th ed. 1931) 204. Chalmers, however, in the latest edition indicates some degree of doubt as to the finality of the rule by stating, "such party,
it seems, is also discharged from liability upon the debt." BILLS OF EXCHANGE
(10th ed. 1932) 157. And a footnote asks-without answering-the pertinent
question, "Must the party discharged be prejudiced by the omission?"
The Uniform Law of Bills and Notes, approved at the International Conference held under the auspices of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1930, (C. 360.
M. 151. 1930. 11., and see supra note 77), leaves the solution of this problem to
the separate determination of each country. Art. 15, Annex II. By the law of
France today both the drawing of a bill and its indorsement operate as an assignment of whatever claim the drawer may have against the drawee at the time the
bill comes due, giving the holder a direct right of action against the drawee of
an unaccepted bill. This means that although the drawer is discharged by delay
in presentment, for example, the holder nevertheless has such right against the
drawee as the drawer would have in the premises. THALLER et PERCEou, TRAITP
tLtMENTAIRE BE DROIT commERcIAL (7th ed. 1925) No. 1419 et seq.; Wahl, Die
franzisische Wechselprovisionslehre (1930) 4 Zeitschrift fiir ausldndisches und
internationalesPrivatrecht405.
By the German law, where the holder of a bill, because of delay in presentment
or the statute of limitations, has lost his recourse on the bill against prior parties,
he may yet recover from the drawer or the drawee the amount to which either
has been unjustly enriched thereby. Law of June 21, 1933, 1933 WEcHSELGESETZ
art. 89.
Nor does it appear that there is any direct holding either in the United States
or England which would preclude recovery by the holder, under the same doctrine
of unjust enrichment, of the amount by which the drawer of a bill benefitted by the
discharge. See Commercial Investment Trust Co. v. Lundgren-Wittenstein Co.,
173 Minn. 83, 84, 216 N. W. 531, 532 (1927), in which the court suggests that the
check rule of pro tanto discharge would apply in the case of a demand bill. See
also, as to time bills, Mogadara v. Holt, 1 Holt, K. B. 113, 90 Eng. Repr. 961.
(1692).
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When one looks still further back, however, it is evident that Mr.
Justice Story had considerable support for his views. In the seventeenth century, when the English merchant began to draw orders upon
his goldsmith banker,128 it does not appear that he thought he was applying to the new institution of banking the already well known bill of
exchange device. 129 The goldsmith receiving deposits of coin or valuable chattels was accustomed to issue a "running cash note," possibly
the ancestor of the promissory note, 3 0o which carried the obligation of
the banker to the holder; but because the amounts were not standardized
circulation was not convenient. Or the goldsmith might issue a "depositor's list," something akin to the duplicate deposit slip or the commercial bank passbook-and of no more assurance to one dealing with
the depositor. Merely to avoid the necessity of personal appearance, the
goldsmith later became content to allow a transfer or withdrawal upon
the written order of the depositor.' 3 ' It is to this device probably
that the check is to be traced ;132 in fact some of the original characteristics still persist1 33 But whatever its lineage it must be remembered the
check is now, by law, a bill of exchange drawn upon a bank payable on
demand.
Moreover, one may well doubt whether the carefully worked out
differences between accepted 'bills and- certified checks are as real as they
seem. These probably grew out of a failure to differentiate demand
bills from time bills. It is only the latter which, being generally accepted before maturity, have been looked upon as two name paper.
Demand bills, like checks, are usually paid on presentment. And, as
might be expected, there is extremely little "law" with respect to acceptances upon demand bills; it was even doubted at one time that they
could be accepted.' 3 4 And it is true that, if one omits the accepted
' See THE MYSTERY OF THE NEw-FASHIONED GOLDSMITHS OR BANKERS, pub"lished in 1676, and incorporated by Martin in his book, Grasshopperin Lombard
Street (1892) 285. In England the goldsmith became a banker of a sort about

the year 1646, or somewhat before. But he was more a warehouseman then than a
modern banker. PowEr.,, EVOLUTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (1915) 58, 62. Upon
the continent banking had a somewhat earlier start. 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1926) 178.
POWELL, op. cit., supra note 128 at 102. Holdsworth, however, stated that
from the beginning the check was regarded as a bill of exchange. Op. cit., supra
note 128, at 190.
" POWELL, op. cit., supra note 128, at 99, et seq.
"'The earliest cheque which has been preserved is dated April 12, 1671. "The

earliest printed cheques are those of Child's, and are believed to date from 1762."
Id. at 103, citing PRIcE, LONDON BANKERS 28.
'" BisscHop, RISE OF THE LONDON MONEY MARKET (1910) 55.
For example, the view that the death of the drawer revokes the authority
of the bank to pay the check. 3 DANIEL, NEGoTIABE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933)
§1817.
' See Bank v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350 (1873), distinguishing between the check

and the time bill.
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accommodation bill, which may conceivably be drawn at demand' on
occasion, it is only when a drawee may wish to accept payable at his
bank in lieu of giving his check or when a banker's draft is accepted
during collection while indorsements are being completed, that the
thing happens at all. In this state of affairs one would be rash to
predict that where the holder of a demand bill has it accepted the drawer
actually continues liable.135 It would be fully as easy to say that a
reasonable time for presentment for payment has run, thus discharging
secondary parties, whenever the holder has brought the paper to the
drawee-unless, indeed, he may be given a brief time thereafter, as
suggested above in the case of checks, in which to make collection.
At all events the difference is not great.
Of course, all this is not to say that there are no important differences between certified checks and accepted bills, even accepted demand bills, for the contrary is the case. 136 But the differences do not
lie so much in the form 3 7 of the instrument as in the safeguards being
thrown around the drawee's obligation in the one case as compared
with the complete absence of any such thing in the other. The statutory requirements forbidding, under threat of heavy punishment, the
138
certification of any check except it be drawn against actual deposits
'~ See CHALMERS, BILLS OF EXCHANGE (10th ed. 1932) 162, where he refers
to a possibility of accepting a demand bill payable at a bank.
" As an example, there have been serious inroads made in the check cases on
the Price v. Neal doctrine. Indeed many courts, in allowing the bank to go to
extreme lengths to correct its errors-so long as the person procuring certification
has not changed his position-have not even seen that the rule developed in the
case of bills had any application. Irving v. Wetherald, 36 N. Y. 335 (1867), set
the example and it has been widely followed. See Dillaway v. Northwestern Nat.
Bank, 82 Ill. App. 71 (1898); Second Nat. Bank v. Western Nat. Bank, 51 Md.
128 (1878) ; Metropolitan Co. v. Bank of U. S., 259 N. Y. 365, 182 N. E. 18 (1932),
noted in (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 151; Security Savings Bank v. King, 69 Ore.
228, 138 Pac. 465 (1914). In the Metropolitant Co. case the bank had overlooked its lien on the drawer's account. Contra in result, though an extra day had
elapsed: Riverside Bank v. Bank of Shenandoah, 74 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
Where the bank has paid cash or credited the holder, instead of certifying, courts
have been more reluctant to allow -the bank to correct its error. 2 MORSE, BANKS
AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §§451, 455. It is interesting to note the willingness
of the courts to analyze these cases to find a change of position, while in the
question whether an antecedent debt constitutes value, which likewise must be

justified on an estoppel or change of position basis, the thing early crystallized into
a hard and fast rule, not admitting of analysis. Both results, however, favor the
banker.
I See BERLE, LIQUID CLAIMS AND NATIONAL WEALTH (1934) 175, in which
this failure to distinguish form from the substance of the differing underlying
transactions in the development of commercial paper is discussed.
' The National Bank Act created a precedent for such statutes. 3rd March,
1869, c. 135, 15 STAT. 335; Ray. STAT. §5208. This act specifically provides that
the bank shall be liable to an innocent holder notwithstanding the violation by the
certifying officer. A Michigan statute without such specific provision has been
interpreted to the same effect. Union Trust Co. v. Preston Bank, 136 Mich.
460, 99 N. W. 399 (1904) ; Bank v. Union Trust Co., 158 Mich. 94, 122 N. W. 547
(1909). Over half the states have similar statutes. See PATON'S DIGEST OF LEa.
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did little more than to spell out the public conception of certification
as an assurance that the banker had real money in hand. In fact
there was no more money than always 139 but it did discourage signing
officers somewhat from being unduly generous with the bank's obligation. But as banking becomes more stable, particularly as deposits are
guaranteed by the Federal government, 140 it becomes very clear that
the certified check moves in an environment quite different from that of
the merchant's bill of exchange. The day of the independent-and
hazardous-private banker has long since passed. And though the
certified check is still not drawn against actual "money in bank," perhaps it may come to be regarded as substantially the equivalent of that.
Viewed from this angle the certified check has reached a new stage
in its development. Though akin to money it has advantages not possessed by money; the indorsement requirement affords the holder a
considerable protection and control, while money, as has been said, has
no earmarks. It becomes something of an anachronism, moreover, to
speak any longer of a secondary liability on the part of the individual
drawer and indorser. As in the case of corporate and municipal securities the principal obligation overshadows all else. 14 1 It is probable that the writers who criticized the early Born decision so vehemently,
though they argued their case very technically, had much this conception
of the effect of certification. Their vision, however, was destined to be
shattered, somewhat rudely, by the depression of 1893, and the earthbound imagination of the courts of that time. Whether the present is a
more favorable time to launch the view that certification-whether for
holder or drawer-should discharge all secondary parties may perhaps
Op. (1926) op. 29a. Overcertification appears to have been more or less common
at one period. Bank of Republic v. Baxter, 31 Vt. 101 (1858) ; Espy v. Bank of
Cincinnati, 85 U. S. 604, 21 L. ed. 947 (1873).
" It is still possible to take a depositor's note, covering the proceeds into his
account, and then to certify his checks against the amount-a bookkeeping transaction but entirely legal. The distinction lies in the fact that many people ordinarily pass upon the note transaction while certification can be by the teller alone.
The theory that the bank can loan its money but not its credit is also illustrated
in the guaranty cases. Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, 87 Fed. 430 (C. C. S. D. Cal.

1898) ; id., 94 Fed. 925 (C. C. A. 9th, 1899) ; Merchant Bank v. Baird, 160 Fed.
642 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908). But the distinction, if it ever existed, was exploded

when national banks were permitted to issue letters of credit. Border Nat. Bank v.

Am. Exch. Nat. Bank, 282 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).
" THE BANKING Acr OF 1933, 48 STAT. 168, 12 U. S.

C. A. Supp. VII §264
(1933). Whether the holder of a certified check is included as a depositor within
the protection of the deposit guaranty provision is not certain. However, the
holder of a certified check was held not to be a depositor protected by the guaranty
fund in Kansas. Lloyd v. Butler County State Bank, 122 Kans. 835, 253 Pac. 906
(1927). See further Lumos Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker, 195 Ala. 552, 70 So. 754

(1916).

' See Steffen, A Proposed Uniform Act Making Investment Instrumnents Negotiable (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rxv. 632, 645.
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be doubted. It may be that the way to do is to await the outcome of
events; if few more banks fail, secondary liability will in fact become
a purely academic matter, though it may still take at least another generation for the courts to awake to the situation and treat payment by
certified check as a discharge and not as conditional 142 settlement only.
THE NEw INSTRUMENT THEORY

When this picture of an increasingly important certified check is
set off against the confusion now prevailing, as first above described,
the contrast is not reassuring. So far from being about to enter upon
a new estate the institution appears to be actually sickening and perhaps about to die. Some banks do not certify checks at all any longer;
many refuse to certify except for the drawer; and all apparently make
use of lawyer drawn phrases of one kind or another to absolve themselves from risk. The whole thing may be called shortsighted, since
the banker gains as much as anyone else in the community when commercial obligations are liquidated promptly and with a minimum of
uncertainty. Payment when made should be final, or as nearly so as
may be, if transactions are to move freely. But shortsighted or not,
the situation exists. There is no gainsaying the point, therefore, that
some effort should be made to clear away the ills that beset certification
and to give direction to its future growth.
At the core of the banker's present discomfiture, insofar as certification matters trouble him at all, is the action of the Illinois and California
courts in putting all loss upon the bank where altered paper is certified.
To those who see negotiable instruments questions only through the
eyes of the bona fide purchaser, without counting costs, those decisions
should be codified without qualification. If the bank must take a dead
loss, since recourse against the forger is not promising, it can of course
insure. Why not? The court in the Wells Fargo case, in fact, went out
of its way to deny the bank any other recourse by saying that the holder
makes no warranties to the drawee.14 3 This was the Ames dictum,
the holder and the drawee bank deal at arms length.14 4 But while there
is reason apparent for charging the drawee with responsibility for the
" See 3 DANIEL, NEGOTrABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §1447, et seq.
" Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 292 Pac. 281, 285
(Cal. App. 1930). And the further holding, -that the drawee "admits" the existence
of the payee-even when the name is the substituted name of the forger-works
to the same end by estopping the bank from raising any question on the point, even
as regards the person procuring the certification.
"'4The case is presented also where share certificates are offered for transfer.
See Ames, Forged Transfers of Stock: Anwther View (1904) 17 HARv. L. REV.
543. But the Ames view has not been followed in these cases. Starkey v. Bank
of England, [1903] A. C. 114. For general discussion see Steffen, A Proposed
Uniform Act Making Investment Instruments Negotiable (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rzv.
632, 654.
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regularity of its drawer's signature and for the adequacy of his account
-both matters peculiarly within the bank's knowledge-the same cannot be said for alterations in the body of the paper. On generally accepted risk analysis principles' 45 it is the person who takes the paper
from the forger, often at a substantial discount,1 40 often with more than
a suspicion of the fraud, 47 who should take this risk.
The first suggestion, therefore, is to provide that the person who
presents a check for certification warrants' 48 to the bank not only that
he has title to the item but that it has not been materially altered. The
purchaser after certification, however, should be deemed to make no
warranty to the drawee, either 'by indorsement or presentment for pay49
ment, except of course that his title to the item as certified is good.'
This suggestion proceeds upon the theory that, upon certification for
the holder, the check is in effect paid-even as pictured by the court in
'See Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Insltrnent.0 Law (1928) 38 YALE
L. J. 25, at pages 27 to 30, for a formulation of principles. Of course if the alteration can be easily detected-even though only by a skilled banker-it is necessary
that payment, and by parity of reasoning certification also, be refused, for the
bank is not given a discharge except for payment in due coursd. See NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUAIENTs LAW §88.
.. GThis profit differential

in favor of the purchaser serves as a means of selfinsurance. By contrast the bank must pay full face value on presentment.
"'7This may be a very real factor but one at the same time very difficult to
establish as a certainty. When the paper comes to the bank, however, as in the
Illinois case, it is given no opportunity to weigh the situation. Insofar as the
relative ability of the parties to avoid the risk is a factor in these cases, therefore,
it is clear that the holder has the greater, in fact the only, opportunity so to do.
'= There have been many dicta in the cases to the effect that the holder makes
some warranty to the drawee upon presenting paper to the drawee for payment.
See judge v. West Phila. Title & T. Co., 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 310 (1917). This
case and several others are quite properly criticized in Brannan's Negotiable Instruiments Law (5th ed. 1932) 699, 748, as having no support under §§65 and 66 N. I. L.,
since those sections provide only for warranties to subsequent holders, not to the
drawee. It, of course, does not follow that a court may not treat the matter
as one of omission ruled by the common law. That there is authority prior to
the act to the effect that a holder makes "a representation and warranty" to the
drawee that the paper he presents has not been raised, see City Bank v. National
Bank, 45 Tex. 203 (1876). It will be observed that by putting recovery on a contract basis the drawee's claim is lifted out of the uncertainties and delays attendant upon a recovery as for money paid under mistake of fact, the present basis of
the drawee's action.
""It may perhaps be questioned why the holder after certification should not
be responsible for alterations occurring between the time of certification and his
purchase of the paper. Some courts have held that an overpayment by the bank
on these facts may be recovered back. Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank of
Hamilton, [1903] A. C. 49; Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Nat. Mechanics Banking
Ass'n of N. Y., 55 N. Y. 211 (1873). It is believed, however, that since the
bank has-or should have-a complete record of the amount for which it certified,
the better rule would be to require it to ascertain at its peril the amount before
making payment. There is strong support for this position. See United States
v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U. S. 527, 46 S. Ct. 388, 70 L. ed.
717 (1926) ; Clews v. Bank of New York Nat. Bk. Ass'n., 114 N. Y. 70, 20 N. E.
852 (1889).
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the Leach case' 50 in holding that the drawer was discharged-and the
bank is put in much the same position as if it had taken up the check
and issued its cashier's check instead, as is often done. The bank in
so doing runs only the usual business risks involved in paying items
generally. The purchaser in good faith, of the certified item, on his
part, takes the instrument in confidence 151 and at its face value. There
would thus be no need for the banker either to abandon the practice
of certifying checks for the holder or to qualify his undertaking so
scrupulously.
Actually only a relatively simple provision is needed to clarify this
aspect of the problem. And since the matter of warranties to the
drawee, as distinguished from warranties in favor of subsequent holders,
is one not covered in any respect by the present Negotiable Instruments Law, 152 a section covering the point should be added to the act.
Such a provision' 53 could be worded as follows:
1 Section 65a Warranty to the Drawee. A person who, as holder,
2 without express stipulation to the contrary, indorses an instru3 ment, or presents an instrument for payment, acceptance or
4 certification, by such indorsement or presentment, warrants to
5 the drawee:
6 1. That he has a good title to the instrument;
7 2. That it has not been raised or otherwise materially altered;
and
8
9 3. That he has no knowledge that the signature of the drawer
(oT of the person making or accepting the instrument pay10
able at a bank) is forged or unauthorized;
11
12 provided that, where a check or other demand instrument (ex13 cept one overdue) 15 4 is accepted or certified, no such warranty
'First Nat. Bank of Jersey City v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350 (1873), discussed
supra note 100.
n Indeed, it would contribute not a little to the holder's confidence if the
courts would stiffen their attitude when dealing with the banker defense that
certification was made by mistake, that is, in the Price v. Neal situation. To force
a holder to prove that he has changed his position, in order that he may enforce
the bank's obligation, is simply ruinous of confidence-and an exception, apparently,
peculiar to certification. See supra note 136. The writer of the Note, Rescission
of Certification Induced by Mistake (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 631, while rational-

izing the certification cases, failed wholly to appreciate the commercial significance

of the problem in approving their result. Even in the letter of credit cases both
court and banker have seen the importance of making the issuing bank's undertaking in fact irrevocable, whether or not given under mistake. See Turner,
Letters of Credit as Negotiable Instruments (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 245.
1 NEGOTIABLE INSTRuMENTS LAW §65. This provision, fixing the indorser's
warranties, applies only in favor of one to whom the paper has been negotiated.
There is no suggestion that the section should be amended.
A similar provision has been prepared for adoption in the proposed Uniform

Bank Collection Act. See

HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CONFERENCE or CoMmissIONERs

(1934) 162, 163.
Technically a matured time instrument is deemed payable upon demand, at

ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS

least as regards parties dealing with it thereafter.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW

§7. There seems very little reason for purposes of the present section to treat
such paper on the same basis with checks.
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on the part of any person who shall have so indorsed or presented it prior thereto shall run in favor of the drawee except it designate upon the face of its acceptance or certification
the holder or purported holder for whom it acted, and no warranty on the part of any person who shall so present or indorse
such an instrument after its acceptance or certification,' 50
shall extend to any matter except that mentioned in sub-diMsion one and that only with respect to the instrument after
its acceptance or certification.

This section would clarify many matters now uncertain from the
viewpoint of the paying banker. 156 On the other hand it would cause
one and possibly two changes in his certification practice. The first
is wholly salutary, that the banker hereafter exercise as much careand he need use no more-in certifying paper as he has been accustomed to employ in making payments of cash. Indeed the Wachtel v.
Rosen decision, discussed above, 15 has given him even greater leeway than he has any need of, since his risk in one case should be no
greater than in the other. The other point will require more definite
change but again it is believed a change for the better. Though many
banks, concerned with stop payment questions, have indicated whether
they certified for holder or for drawer,'15 it has never been customary
to show upon the face of the paper exactly who procured certification. The section as drafted would require this change, partly because
the certifying bank should have the information for its own protection, but largely to clear the record for the benefit of subsequent purchasers. At present a person in taking a certified check is unable to
tell who may have had it certified, and accordingly he does not know
whether the drawer and indorsers have been discharged or not, a very
It might be well to insert at this point the phrase: "Who was not himself a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument nor a holder thereof prior
jo its acceptance or certification." It may be, however, that the courts can be
trusted to deal with the problem satisfactorily as cases arise.
' Among these is the matter of the holder's guaranty of prior indorsements.
The section makes it unnecessary for the holder to use an express guaranty for
the purpose, as is customary, particularly where the bank presenting the paper
appears to be an agent only for the forwarder. See National Bank of Commerce

v. Bossemeyer, 101 Neb. 96, 162 N. W. 503, L. R. A. 1917E 374 (1917).

This is

accomplished by the words "as holder" in the first line of the section, it being assumed that the phrase includes agent holders as well as all others. In fact it
should be noted that the section carries even further in that the instrument is
likewise warranted against alteration. The reason for this is the same as that
which gave rise to the use of the warranty of indorsements. Whether both matters are covered by the customary phrase, Prior indorsements guaranteed, is perhaps doubtful. New York Produce Exch. Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 134 App.
Div. 953, 119 N. Y. Supp. 988 (1909).
See note, Interpretations of "all prior

indorsements guaranteed" (1933)
'

Supra note 66.

11 N. C. L. RFv. 318-20.
"' See supra note 56.
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unsatisfactory state of affairs, 159 but obviously one rather easily remedied.160
There may be other flies in the ointment, but one which must 'be

considered, concerns the matter of title. Anglo-American law with respect to order paper, except indeed as respects the paying banker in
England,' 6 ' differs from that of the rest of the commercial world in
its insistence upon genuine, duly authorized, indorsements. 1 2
For
many generations the person whose indorsement has been forged,
when armed with the action of conversion, has been permitted to follow his instrument into whosesoever hands it may have gone. The law
of continental Europe, on the contrary, protects the good faith purchaser, 163 as it does in the situation where altered paper has been
accepted, 164 though strangely enough the use of checks at least has
never become so widespread there as here. Nonetheless the operation of
our rule is particularly disquieting to the person who has taken a certified check-without discount-more or less as though it were cash.
Some limitation is suggested.
Fortunately a way out of the difficulty has already been foreshad-

owed, and this without sacrifice of any of the protection afforded by
our present indorsement requirements.

As a matter of fact, when a

'It is provided without qualification in §188 N. I. L. that "the drawer and
all indorsers are discharged" where the holder procures certification. It is difficult
to argue that this discharge is personal to the particular holder and does not affect
subsequent purchasers, as is the case where defaulted demand paper is further negotiated without notice of dishonor to secondary parties. O'Keefe v. Dunn, 6
Taunt. 305 (C. P. 1815).
' The suggestion that the bank indicate upon its certification stamp the name
of the holder procuring certification would not entail any serious burden. Of
course, if and when the suggestion supra is adopted eliminating secondary liability
in the case of certified paper -the point will be of lesser importance. But even in
such case it will carry an assurance to the purchaser as to the freshness of his title.
.1 BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT §60. See discussion in LoaxxzEN, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES (1919) 48.
' NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §23; BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT §24. And see
generally United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 293 U. S. 340, 55 Sup. Ct.
221, 79 L. ed. 199 (1934).
'1 Under the Geneva Uniform Law of Bills and Notes (C. 360. M. 151. 1930.
II.), which followed the German law on the point, a holder who acquires an instrument in good faith, under an uninterrupted series of indorsements, has a good
title notwithstanding that one or more of the indorsements were forged. Art. 16.
The same rule is embodied in the Geneva Uniform Cheque Law, (C. 294. M. 137.
1931. II B.), Arts. 19, 21. Concerning this "most striking conflict between the
Anglo-American and Continental systems," see 'Hudson and Feller, Unification of
Laws of Bills of Exchange (1930) 44 HAv. L. RLv. 333, 354; CHALMERS, IN
LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNIFICATION OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND

PRO~lssoRy NOTES (1923) 103.
1' The Geneva Uniform Law of Bills and Notes (C. 360. M. 151. 1930. n1.),
provides: Art. 69, "In case of alteration of the text of a bill of exchange, parties
who have signed subsequent to the alteration are bound according -to the terms of
the altered text; parties who signed before the alteration are bound according to
the terms of the original text." The same rule is contained in the Geneva Uniform Cheque Law (C. 294. M. 137. 1931. II.B.), Art. 51. See supra note 77.
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check is certified for a holder-if the newly issued instrument picture
is to be fully respected-the bank's certification obligation, at least,
should be stripped of all prior defect of title questions, as fully as if the
bank had issued its own cashier's check in payment. Were this fully
recognized the result would be to bring our law and that of the continental countries closely together at this point, though of course no rights
to the certified paper could thereafter be acquired in this country except
by indorsement in due course. Nor, of course, would the holder be
given any recourse to parties prior to the person procuring certification. As for the person whose indorsement had been forged, his rights
could 'be worked out as though he still held the check presented for
certification. 165 In other words a sharp line would be drawn at the
point of certification. The result should be greatly to ease the transfer of certified paper and at no expense to the traditions.
The matter, once more, can be rather easily handled by the addition
of a provision to the Negotiable Instruments Law. The present section
62 of the act, 166 which gave the trouble to the Illinois and California
courts, -was quite evidently drafted with only the time bill of exchange
in mind. When faced with the problem whether to force the certified
check into the time paper mold or to rework the section, those courts
chose to do the latter, with the results which have been seen. Chalmers,
the draftsman of the section of the British act after which the American
section 62 was patterned, gave very little if any thought to the problem of the accepted demand bill1a 7 and of course had had no experience
with the certified check. In fact there would be little cause to mention
the accepted demand bill even now, but since, as has been suggested, 10 8
' The situation is similar to that where a registered bond has been transferred
upon a forged indorsement, a bearer instrument being issued in its stead. In such
case the issuing company is liable to the person whose indorsement was forged
and also to the purchaser of the transferred instrument. See Davis v. The Bank
of England, 2 Bing. 393 (C. P. 1824), and general discussion, Steffen and Russell,

Registered Bonds and NegotiaYility (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 741, 747. The comparable situation as to share certificates at common law is reviewed in Rand v.
Hercules Powder Co., 129 Misc. 891, 223 N. Y. Supp. 383 (1927).
' There is obviously no need to amend §62 of the N. I. L. since that section
has never been construed -tomake the acceptor of time paper liable according to the
altered tenor of the paper at the time of acceptance. And even in Illinois and
California the adoption of the proposed section relative to checks and demand paper
would probably suffice to point the distinction.

" BILs OF EXCHANGE Acr §54. See CHALMERs, BiLLs or EXCHANGE (9th ed,
1927) 214 et seq.
' Beutel, Bank Collections Act (1935) 9 TULANE L. Rzv. 378, 388. It is true
that Beutel fails to make any distinction between time and demand paper within
§62. He may consider that the two decisions respecting certified checks, one in
Illinois and the other in California, have completely reversed the settled AngloAmerican law on -the point as respects time bills. In so doing he would have no
decided case in his favor and the position as regards certified checks is itself by
no means generally approved. The cases are collected in BRANNAN, Op. Cit., mspra
note 148, at 607 et seq.
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it should probably be put on the same footing with the certified check,
rather than upon that of the accepted time instrument, the proposed
section is drafted broadly to cover 'both.1 69 The point as regards demand bills is of minor practical consequence. The following is accordingly suggested:
1 Section 62a. LIABILITY OF ACCEPTOR OF DEMAND
2 INSTRUMENT. The acceptor by accepting or certifying a
3 check or other demand instrument, at the request of a holder or
4 purported holder, without express stipulation to the contrary,
5 admits the matters and things mentioned in section 62 and in
6 addition engages to pay the instrument, to the person so pro7 curing it to be accepted or certified, according to its tenor
8 or purported tenor as presented, that is to say if it has
9 been raised or otherwise altered according to its tenor as
10 so raised or altered, but subject to any warranty as mentioned
11 in section 65a.
The person so procuring acceptance or certification shall
12
13 have power to negotiate the instrument and a subsequent holder
14 in due course thereof shall hold it as so accepted or certified
15 free of any defect of title on the part of the person so pro16 curing acceptance or certification or of any prior party, 17 0
17 but without any rights against any such latter party upon or
18 in connection with the instrument. Where the person so pro19 curing acceptance or certification is a purported holder, 171 the
20 real owner may draw up a copy of the instrument as presented
21 for certification and have such rights on and in connection
22 therewith as against all parties prior to such holder in due
23 course, including the drawee3t 2 as he would have had upon
24 the original instrument had it not been so accepted or certi25 fled, 11 3 and no others.
The implications of this provision deserve a further word of comment. The bank's dbligation upon certification -would always be in
' By so doing any need to distinguish closely between certification and acceptance of demand paper is avoided.
'' This provision is extremely important if the holder after certification is to
be fully protected. For example, in case a check once delivered to a payee were
to be stolen and the name of the forger substituted for that of the payee, there
would be nothing whatever in present law to prevent the payee from suing any
subsequent party to whom it might be negotiated in conversion-and that, whether
the item had been certified after or before the alteration. Which, of course, would

cut away many of the supposed advantages to be gained by the construction put on

§62 N. I. L. by the Illinois and California courts.
'x Either' because of a missing prior indorsement or because a purported indorsement may have been forged or made without authority.
"' The point is in conflict whether a drawee which has paid an instrument at
the request of someone holding through a forged indorsement should be liable
in conversion. The cases are collected in BRANwAN, op. cit., supra note 148, at
1070 et seq.; and note (1934) 12 Tzm. L. Rav. 226-8.
' This assumes that the acceptance in such case would not be binding on the
drawee in favor of the person whose indorsement was forged, as is usually held.
See particularly First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343, 24 L. ed. 229 (1876).
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terms, at least, to pay to the order of the person who as holder had
procured the certification, even although he may have stolen the paper
and perhaps have raised it in amount. It will be observed, however,
that in case he were a forger its obligation would be met and nullified
by his express warranties; he would acquire no additional rights by virtue of the certification. What then of the position of the jeweler in
the Illinois case with which this discourse started? Quite positively
he would have to refund the amount of the check, contrary to the court's
decision and the views of the many apologists'1 4 for that decision. So
far as the bank could determine the check was presented to it by Barnett as a holder, it had been indorsed by the forger, and Barnett should
therefore be held to fully warrant his title and the regularity of the
paper. To do otherwise would be to put him in an even better position
5
than if he had been paid in cash.Y7
Finally, and quite apart from the fortunes of Mr. Barnett, for he
no doubt has long since forgotten about the matter, what of the position of the certified check? It is believed that the forward looking
banker, zealous of the good name of his own institution, will consider
that the bargain here proposed is a fair one. If so, and legislation of
the character suggested is adopted,'1 6 he will discontinue use of qualify' In addition to those cited supra note 12, see Beasley, Liability of Drawee
Bank, etc. (1931) 10 TmNz . L. REV. 87, who sees no basis for any difference between the cases where the drawer's signature is forged and those where some third
person may have altered the instrument. His failure to distinguish the two situations is based on nothing more substantial than his opinion that the bank "has
the means of possessing a better knowledge of the genuineness of the instrument
than a holder who has perhaps never taken a check of the drawer before" and further because, "The drawee bank is in a position to know the custom of the drawer,
the usual amounts of his checks, and the person to whom he usually gives checks,
all from its previous experience in paying them." Id. at 105. The argument is
preposterous as applied to a large city account and ignores completely the many
other considerations involved. See supra notes 146, 147.
' See, granting recovery to the drawee in such case, Farmer's Bank v. Bank
of Abbeville, 29 Ga. App. 472, 116 S. E. 204 (1923). The court said in effect that
-the holder in presenting paper for payment warrants that it has not been altered.
Of course, in the Illinois case, had the forger procured the certification and then
sold his paper to the jeweler the case would have been entirely different. In such
case under the proposed section there would be no liability on his part to the
drawee. Moreover, in either case, the collecting banks handling the certified paper
would not be responsible upon warranty to the certifying bank. Its paper would
be handled at face value.
176 There is already legislation in the field which would have to be repealed.
See ORE. CODE (1930) 22-1402. This section would probably deny all recovery
to a purported holder where the forgers name had been substituted for that of the
payee since the banks engagement is stated to be only according to the original
tenor of the paper. In addition §4 of the widely adopted Bankers' Collection Code
would also have to be repealed or at least modified. For an able discussion of
this act with citations to most of the state statutes see Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Banker's Association (1933) 8 TULANE L. REv. 21.
The preference parts of the statute have recently been held inapplicable to national
banks. See Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 341.
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ing stamps agreeing to pay only according to original tenor. The promiscuous use of the "when properly indorsed" clause, likewise, will go;
it would be no longer necessary. The result, it would seem, would
be to give the institution a renewal of its lease upon life; checks might
well be certified once more as freely for the holder as for the drawer.
Instead of the certified check being an instrument to compare unfavorably with the merchant's bill of exchange, as Miller J. regarded it in
the Espy case,'177 it would have far outstripped the bill as a ready and
dependable medium of exchange. If nothing is done, this study, so far
from suggesting a blue print for the future widespread use of the
certified check, might perhaps better serve as an obituary notice.
'r Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 85 U. S. 604, 620; 21 L. ed. 947, 951 (1873).

